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Abstract:  In several countries, cost recovery and/or rent collection (CRRC) has 
become integral to fishery management. This paper will examine CRRC 
from three perspectives: neo-classical economic efficiency, equity, and 
public choice. Partial equilibrium economic efficiency arguments include 
incentives for industry to implement (or lobby for) efficient delivery of 
management services. On the resource rent side, there is the static 
Henry George argument that taxes on pure resource rentals have no 
efficiency effect. There is also the Harberger general equilibrium 
argument that the decision to tax or not to tax may distort resource 
allocation across sectors. The public choice analysis embeds the 
efficiency and equity issues within the context of rent-seeking through 
and within government decision-making. For example, public choice 
analysis would suggest that CRRC may be a form of public agency rent-
seeking. CRRC may act as a dedicated tax, with its concomitant 
incentives for agencies. These multiple perspectives suggest that the 
economic verdict on CRRC is very complicated. 
 